07 August 2011
Hotel Lawyer with what it all means: The M Waikiki’s lawsuit seeking to terminate Marriott as its hotel operator for the Edition Waikiki, in Honolulu.
I was recently interviewed by Jason Freed of HotelNewsNow (a division of Smith Travel Research) about three high profile lawsuits in the hospitality industry.
The first case we discussed was the recent lawsuit filed by the owner of the 353-room Edition Waikiki against Marriott and Ian Schrager. As the hotel’s owner, M Waikiki LLC asked the New York Supreme Court to terminate its 50-year, no-cut hotel management agreement (HMA) with Marriott on its $250 million Honolulu hotel and to award damages for misrepresentation and breach of contract.
This lawsuit raises issues we have covered extensively in the HMA Handbook and in many articles under the Topic of Hotel Management Agreements on www.HotelLawBlog.com, See, for example, “Hotel management agreement terminations — Is there a better way?.”
This is an interesting lawsuit, so first let’s look at the background facts and then let’s see what the claims and the implications are.
For a response from Marriott, please see “Hotel Lawyer with more on M Waikiki Edition lawsuit against Marriott – What Marriott’s General Counsel says.”
Click here to download a copy of the complaint.
Background
The owner has suffered millions of dollars of operating losses under Marriott’s management, and has received no return on its $250 million investment in the Edition Waikiki.
The owner acquired the hotel in 2006 for $112 million, and then spent an additional $138 million in renovation, including those required to be an “Edition” branded hotel. It thus has a total investment in the hotel of $250 million.
After acquisition, the owner sought to evaluate whether to brand the hotel or operate it as an independent unbranded hotel.
In June 2007, Marriott announced its arrangement with Ian Schrager to create a new boutique hotel brand – “Edition.” Extensive plans were announced including that 22 gateway cities would be the first locations for Edition hotels. Marriott announced that it expected to have 5 Edition hotel deals by the end of the year and 100 Edition hotels within 10 years.
The complaint then alleges that Bill Marriott and his team launched an aggressive campaign to convert owner’s hotel to an Edition, promising that Marriott would devote its considerable resources to make the hotel a success from the day it opened its doors. Marriott presented rosy projections, showing that in its first year of operation the hotel would earn more than $14 million in profit on $53 million of gross revenue, and that the hotel would have an occupancy rate of 68% with and average daily rate (ADR) of $400.
The hotel, which had recently been completely renovated, is performing at only 37% of its competitive set. The hotel is branded with Marriott’s new Edition flag — a brand with few other properties and little name recognition.
The complaint also alleges that Ian Schrager promised he would be personally involved in the design and operational development of the hotel. The owner says that Schrager promised his personal involvement in key design meetings would ensure that the hotel had the style elements necessary for the hotel to be a success.
The owner claims that the hotel, which had recently been completely renovated, is performing at only 37% of its competitive set. The hotel is branded with Marriott’s new Edition flag — a brand with few other properties and little name recognition.
What went wrong at the Edition Waikiki?
What went wrong? The facts in the complaint show that just about everything that could go wrong did go wrong, including Marriott’s failure to develop and support the brand, Ian Schrager’s turning a cold shoulder on his promises of personal involvement, and ultimately the apparent abandonment of the brand by Schrager and Marriott.
When hotels operate at a loss for a sustained time, the tensions between operator and owner increase greatly. Operators are in virtually complete control of the hotel. They have complete control over all the activities that might generate income [as well as things on] the expense side of things
On top of that, the operating results at the hotel were abysmal. Marriott should have been ashamed to operate a hotel with these numbers. The complaint says that the hotel, which had a major $138 million renovation, performed at only 37% of its competitive set.
Starting in August of 2009, Marriott began reducing its projections of profit for the first year from more than $14 million in profit on $53 million of gross revenue to a net operating profit of $6.5 million on gross revenues of $37.5 million, with an occupancy of 62% and ADR of $319. A month later revised projections continued to project less and so it continued.
Needless to say, the owner has suffered millions of dollars of operating losses under Marriott’s management, and has received no return on its $250 million investment in the Edition Waikiki.
There are two main prongs to this complaint
- The first prong goes to the Manager’s failure to (a) drive the gross income or gross revenue (bring in paying guests who spend money for rooms, food & beverage or other
In all cases, the very specific language of the HMA, and the skill of the advocate developing the case, are critical to the success of the claim.
accommodations), and (b) reduce or hold down expenses when the hotel is operating at a greatly reduced capacity. The essence of this claim is the one we have talked about at length: less than 30% occupancy, the failure to generate enough income, and the reduction of expenses caused $6 million of operating losses (negative cash flow) instead of an operating profit of $14 million as originally projected. That is before mortgage payments or other debt service.
- The second prong goes to the “Edition” brand. The complaint suggests that there were representations that the hotel owner would be joining an existing chain of at least 9 hotels, commitments to build the brand rapidly, and other promises of making the owner’s hotel profitable. There are also references in the hotel management agreement (HMA) to the hotel being operated as part of the “chain” of “Edition” hotels. The essence of this claim is that there is no “chain” of hotels and that the brand was not developed as promised.
The tension between hotel operators and owners
The tension between owner and operator is ever-present, but exacerbated in difficult financial situations
When hotels operate at a loss for a sustained time, the tensions between operator and owner increase greatly. Operators are in virtually complete control of the hotel. They have complete control over all the activities that might generate income from the talents and skill sets of the people they hire at the property and corporate level, to what marketing programs they develop, and how they tap into corporate or other resources to develop business at the hotel. They also control (or fail to control) the expense side of things, determining what restaurants to keep open, hours of concierge service, the prices or charges for everything at the hotel, and staffing levels.
Under these circumstances, owners feel helpless and often seek cooperation from operators to change the way they are operating to reduce losses and create a profit or breakeven. When the operator is in control of everything, who is to blame for sustained bad results? Often owners do not feel that operators are doing enough, and may want to force some kind of change in operations or even a termination of the relationship, feeling that almost anything has to be better than what they have.
Operators tend to feel that they are doing the best they can under difficult circumstances. They have their own profit situation to monitor and their own shareholders to satisfy. But they also feel that they have to maintain the integrity of their brand, and that compromises for short term profit management may cause long-term damage to the value of their brand. They often say that they made a deal with owners and the owners should live by the agreement and provide whatever capital it takes to ride out the downturn or other difficulty.
How common are these situations, claims and suits?
The complaint’s claim for . . . failure to develop the “brand” and the “chain” are NOT the typical type of claim . . . There have certainly been similar claims made by owners over the years involving brands such as RockResorts, Amfac, Red Lion, Wyndham, Doubletree, Le Meridien and others as the brands changed direction overnight and disappointed owners.
The tension between owner and operator is ever-present, but exacerbated in difficult financial situations. The wrestling over approving budgets and forcing compliance is the same, and often depends upon the terms of the HMA. Some HMAs give owners no right to approve any budgets, while others give limited r
ights, but usually leave the operator in control while disputed line items are arbitrated. Too often there is no standard for how the arbitrator is to decide whether to allow the disputed budget item except for the operator’s “brand standards.” And who is likely to win when the branded operator says the budget item is necessary to maintain its standards?
While the arguments are common, if not ubiquitous, over budgets, revenue generation and expense control, a relatively small proportion of these arguments result in lawsuits or arbitration. There are few lawsuits because most HMAs require the disputes to be solved by binding arbitration. And a relatively small proportion of arguments are arbitrated because operators make them a war of attrition – very expensive and difficult to win. Plus, if the owner loses, he is stuck with the operator which is still in complete control of the hotel and the operator may now carry a grudge. Those monthly review meetings may have a very chilly or even hostile feeling.
What happens in the lawsuits? What do the cases say?
That said, the reported case decisions on owner terminations of operator management agreements are virtually all favorable to owners
Trial court proceedings are not “reported” cases, so the decision may be brief and difficult to find. Only cases that are appealed and decided by appellate courts result in “reported” decisions which become part of our case law and precedent for other cases.
Arbitrations are “private.” There are no court reporters. They are often subject to confidentiality provisions. And arbitrator decisions, where they are to be found, often tend to be informal and sketchy.
That said, the reported case decisions on owner terminations of operator management agreements are virtually all favorable to owners on why the HMA creates an “agency relationship,” why the agency is not “coupled with an interest,” why there is an absolute right of the owner to terminate such contracts (though the owner may be subject to damages), and that this agency creates fiduciary duties imposed on the operator.
None of the decided cases has specifically focused on whether the acts of the operator were sufficient breaches of contract to justify the termination without liability, although the Embassy Suites vs. Robert E Woolley originated with the owner’s claims that the operator’s problems with the budget were grounds for termination.
There is no way to know how many unreported lawsuits or arbitrations may exist on this matter. From our own experience, I would say the claims are “not uncommon,” though most are resolved or settled prior to decision.
What is really “special” then about the Edition Waikiki lawsuit?
Marriott announced that it expected to have 5 Edition hotel deals by the end of the year and 100 Edition hotels within 10 years.
The complaint’s claim for the defendants’ misrepresentations about and failure to develop the “brand” and the “chain” are NOT the typical type of claim we have been discussing and are less common because a new brand is involved in fewer situations. There have certainly been similar claims made by owners over the years involving brands such as RockResorts, Amfac, Red Lion, Wyndham, Doubletree, Le Meridien and others as the brands changed direction overnight and disappointed owners. Some were successful in terminating the HMA. Others were not. Several involved the claim that the operator was no longer a “chain” and/or was incapable of providing chain services. Others were based upon other factors. In all cases, the very specific language of the HMA, and the skill of the advocate developing the case, are critical to the success of the claim.
Other issues raised
Terminating a bad operator is a little like worrying about the barn doors after all the horses are out of the barn. Sometimes you get your horses back. Sometimes you don’t. But it is always easier to make sure the barn doors are closed first.
With hotel management agreements, the first thing to check is that you have the right brand for your hotel, and then that you have a great operator with a fair HMA that protects your critical interests. If you have to wait 50 years until the contract expires or sue your operator, you have already lost.
Selecting the right operator
Selecting the right operator for its hotel is one of the most important decisions a hotel owner will make. It is a decision that will affect the profitability and value of the hotel for a very long time. The selection process must be intentional and disciplined and should take into account the owner’s needs, the operator’s capabilities and the terms of their agreement.
No matter how strongly a brand may court an owner, or how strongly an owner feels about the “perfect” brand for its property, a disciplined approach to selecting an operator is always the best approach. To assist owners in this process, we have developed the proprietary “Hotel Management Agreement Procedure to Recruit an Operator” or HMA PRO™.
JMBM’s HMA PRO™ Checklist is a 50-point, detailed list of all the business and legal issues which an owner needs to resolve prior to or during the earliest stages of negotiating the term sheet or letter of intent (LOI) with the operator. All the other matters are more technical items that can be hashed out in the actual negotiation of the Hotel Management Agreement itself, after the term sheet or LOI is finished.
Hotel Management Agreements — the HMA Handbook
The Hotel Management Agreement (HMA), which allocates risk between the hotel operator and the hotel owner, is critical to the successful and profitable relationship between the owner and operator. Owners and operators with a well-thought-out and fair agreement can avoid the kind of expensive litigation that surrounds the termination of an operator. We have covered HMA issues extensively in the Hotel Law Blog, and have compiled them in to the HMA Handbook. To register for your free copy, go to HMA Handbook.
To read Jason Freed’s article, see Checking in on high profile lawsuits on HotelNewsNow.
Click here to read my commentary on Hotel Lawyer on the fiduciary, contractual and agency duties of hotel brokers – Host Hotels & Resorts LP v. Molinaro Koger litigation.
Click here to read my commentary on Hotel Lawyer on the importance of brands — intellectual property rights and what they mean.
Other articles on Hotel Law Blog about terminating hotel management agreements
More on M Waikiki Edition lawsuit against Marriott – What Marriott’s General Counsel says
M Waikiki’s Edition lawsuit against Marriott and Ian Schrager – an owner’s HMA dispute with Marriott
Terminating hotel operators: Turnberry Resort drops Fairmont flag
Hotel management agreement terminations — Is there a better way?
Terminating hotel management agreements when things don’t work? Not easy, but not impossible either.
Ritz-Carlton Bali hotel management agreement termination further court order
How to terminate a hotel management agreement when an operator really deserves it!
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This is Jim Butler, author of www.HotelLawBlog.com and hotel lawyer, signing off. We’ve done more than $87 billion of hotel transactions and have developed innovative solutions to unlock value from hotels. Who’s your hotel lawyer?
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Our Perspective. We represent hotel lenders, owners and investors. We have helped our clients find business and legal solutions for more than $125 billion of hotel transactions, involving more than 4,700 properties all over the world. For more information, please contact Jim Butler at jbutler@jmbm.com or +1 (310) 201-3526.
Jim Butler is a founding partner of JMBM, and Chairman of its Global Hospitality Group® and Chinese Investment Group®. Jim is one of the top hospitality attorneys in the world. GOOGLE “hotel lawyer” and you will see why.
Jim and his team are more than “just” great hotel lawyers. They are also hospitality consultants and business advisors. They are deal makers. They can help find the right operator or capital provider. They know who to call and how to reach them.